Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. �8��-�f �aq��aj8b ��ls8�`��r���� �Y����n�'ҳ�{�5D�H|j6��e on Hilary Putnam’s “The Meaning of ‘Meaning. Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality, Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies, Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous, Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works, Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment, Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism, Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness, Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness, Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Misc, Functionalist Theories of Consciousness, Misc, Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness, Biological Theories of Consciousness, Misc, Internalism and Externalism about Experience, Immunity to Error through Misidentification, Nonconceptual/Prereflective Self-Consciousness, Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes, Externalism and Psychological Explanation, Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc, Content Internalism and Externalism, Miscellaneous, Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content, Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content, Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content, Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content, Prototype and Exemplar Theories of Concepts, The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc, Attention and Consciousness in Psychology, Desire Satisfaction Accounts of Well-Being, Conceivability, Imagination, and Possibility, Observation-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Expression-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Rationality-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge, First-Person Authority and Privileged Access, First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, Infallibility and Incorrigibility In Self-Knowledge, Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy of Mind, The psychule: a model for the fundamental unit of consciousness. 29 0 obj<>endobj “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Tyler Burge’s “Individualism and the Mental”. mind-internal properties on their own cannot fix the meanings of words or what their reference is. classic paper, “Quining Qualia,” he gives a number, used by philosophers seems to invite impossible and perhaps. 1979. decide to do what we do because of how we already are. 17 0 R T, defined functionally as the mechanism that encodes and transmits genetic information. Can anyone see a problem with this reasoning? properly the cause of our actions, not some mystical immaterial substance of the mind. Internalists, of course, reject this claim. 1974. 60 0 obj<>stream w9�6�V��6L!C�Xz`��B�ӛz�Z�c�)E�0����^��$4�m�.����@'�;jI".�6[��l�C�ؓ��� d��& �|$}���/��������aJ�!�P doesn’t learn anything new when she leaves her room. endobj immaterial thinking substance. In functional reduction we identify the functional/causal role that the phenomenon we are interested plays and then reduce that, role to a physical (token) state that realizes it. 16 0 R , 171-77 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the room. It is just that if she had stayed home and studied the past w. change the past or even the laws of nature. the worries that have been raised against functionalism. 48 0 obj<>endobj 30 0 obj<>endobj scientific enquiry. Just what makes our contents what they are? ! Format: PDF Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 338 View: 314. Philosophy of Mind and the Problem of Free Will in the Light of Quantum Mechanics. satisfactorily before many philosophers will be content with a functionalist theory of mind. The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the, Nicholas of Cusa on Peace, Religion, and Wisdom in Renaissance Context, (copy editor) is a librarian who works on, https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-of, https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-, >=C5=C9B>A71=9I54D=45A85149=7B1=4BD285149=7B /5B, <175BC81C3>=E5H9=6>A<1C9>=9=3;D45;C5A=1C9E5*, A1?8B381ACB1=4<1?B1;B>9=3;D453>=C5GCD1;>ABD? mental properties as well—they would come “for free. LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. And this distinction. abstract things. How are the contents of our beliefs, our intentions, and other attitudes individuated? 0000004374 00000 n Dissertation, University of California Berkeley. That is what a gene does. endobj Beginning with the nature of the mind, they, include: Are minds separate from bodies or is the mind really just the body? ), artworks for the cover, which fits the book perfectly. He argues that a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge helps to show that there is no epistemic gap. from competitions among processors and outputs for a limited working memory, representational views, i.e., they cannot capture the, argues that the relevant kind of information integration is necessary and sufficient for, comprehensive, and each theory discussed above has many more details that.